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Meredith Tunick 
Promoting Innovation in the European 
Union 
On the Development of Sound Competition and In-
dustrial Policies 
Introduction  
Science, technology, innovation, and competiveness are subjects that con-
cern almost every government in the world. In the current global environ-
ment, the capacity of an economy to derive competitive advantages through 
technical change and innovation is at the core of its ability to sustain eco-
nomic growth and competitiveness. Policy makers are therefore challenged 
daily to create policies and programs that allow firms and institutions to 
innovate and diffuse, adapt, and apply information and knowledge effi-
ciently and effectively.
1 In the European Union (EU), policy makers are 
under particular pressure to make swift policy changes so that the EU can 
meet its Lisbon Strategy goal of becoming the most “competitive and dy-
namic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth” by 2010.
2  
 
1   Luc Soete and Bas ter Weel, Schumpeter and the Knowledge-Based Economy: On 
Technology and Competition Policy. (Maastricht, The Netherlands: Department of 
Economics, University of Maastricht and Maastricht Economic Research Institute 
on Innovation and Technology, 1999). 
2   Lisbon Agenda, Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, March 23-24, 
2000,  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm  Meredith Tunick 
4   
In attempting to explain differences in growth performance, economists 
long focused on analyzing differences in capital and land. But in the new 
world economy these old concepts have been replaced with new ones − 
ideas and human creativity (and the ability to apply new concepts to practi-
cal uses in an efficient manner) are now widely regarded as the ultimate 
sources of economic growth. Consequently, economists have started to rec-
ognize that knowledge accumulation can be analyzed like the accumulation 
of any other capital good. One can even apply economic principles to the 
production and exchange of knowledge.
3 
Moreover, knowledge accumulation can be produced and used in the pro-
duction of other goods, even in the production of itself.
4  Thus, we can infer 
that innovation and knowledge are the new main source of wealth of na-
tions, business, and people. And thanks to information and communication 
technologies, the speed at which knowledge is accumulated and diffused in 
today’s world is faster than ever. This fundamental change has created 
great opportunities for many countries, and at the same time served as a 
stumbling block for others. The EU is currently facing difficulties that stem 
from major shifts in the global economy between the 1970s and 1990s (i.e., 
Asia’s rapid growth).
5 During this period, Europe’s productivity growth 
slowed compared to its competitors, and as a result it experienced losses 
that were manifested particularly in technologically sophisticated sectors. 
Accordingly, Europe’s ability to restore productivity growth losses, namely 
in technologically sophisticated sectors, and remain competitive in the 
global economy has become increasingly difficult.
6  
 
3   Soete and ter Weel, Schumpeter and the Knowledge-Based Economy, 4.  
4   Ibid.  
5   Japan and the Asian firms increased their overall market share between 1970 and 
1995 by more than five times, from 2.1 to 10.8 percent of the global market. This 
rapid growth was accompanied by structural change which in turn altered the spe-
cialization pattern of these countries. In contrast, both Europe and the U.S. lost 
overall market shares − these losses were generally visible in high technology sec-
tors, namely in science-based industries. 
6   For a long-run perspective on Europe’s growth and competitiveness, see Jan Fager-
berg, Paolo Guerrieri, and Bart Verspagen, The Economic Challenge for Europe: 
Adapting to Innovation Based Growth (Cheltenham, England: Elgar Publishing, 
1999).  Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
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Without an understanding of what shapes innovation processes in Europe, 
it is very difficult to design policies in this area.
7 Because the production of 
knowledge does not take the form of physical goods or equipment, it can be 
difficult to assess and can often be severely underestimated in policy. 
However, policy makers should be aware that knowledge production 
“blueprints” can be seen in patents, designs, software programs, and manu-
scripts, as well as in human beings and in organizations. The difficulty of 
measuring knowledge production can be tackled by evaluating bibliometric 
data, research and development (R&D) indicators, patent data, and innova-
tion figures. Measuring the effects of innovation is quite important; some 
empirical evidence shows that innovation is so significant that innovation 
in specific firms can have economy-wide effects.
8  
Given the importance of innovation to a knowledge-based economy, it is 
essential that policy makers give adequate attention to the evaluation, ex-
amination, and dissection of the process of knowledge creation for innova-
tion-based policies to be efficient and effective. Due to the economic 
effects of globalization and the speed at which knowledge is now accumu-
lated and diffused, Europe’s policy makers face new challenges − namely, 
creating policies that restore the dynamism, creativity, and competitiveness 
that characterized the European economy in earlier periods.
9 These modern 
policies must be based on innovation and knowledge to be successful. In 
addition, with 27 Member States, the EU has an intricate system to manage, 
as not all countries are able to catch up at the same rate or to the same ex-
tent.
10 In light of these challenges that face EU policy makers, this paper 
attempts to address two fundamental questions: What is innovation? And 
 
7   Fagerberg, Guerrieri, and Verspagen, Economic Challenge for Europe, 1-19. 
8   Haider Khan, “Building an Innovative Economy Through Managed Creative De-
struction: A Theory with Applications to South Korea” (MPRA Paper 7713, Uni-
versity Library of Munich, Germany, 2008).  
9   Fagerberg, Guerrieri, and Verspagen, The Economic Challenge for Europe, 228-
237. 
10  Rajneesh Narula, “Understanding Absorptive Capacities in an ‘Innovation Systems’ 
Context: Consequences for Economic and Employment Growth” (Danish Research 
Unit for Industrial Dynamics, Copenhagen Business School, 2003). Meredith Tunick 
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what kind of policy is best suited for the job − one anchored in competition 
policy or industrial policy?  
Evaluation of the EU’s economic performance is often couched in short-
term analyses. However, innovation and knowledge are strongly linked to 
long-term growth. Therefore, this paper takes a broader, big-picture ap-
proach and explores knowledge creation in a long-run context. A discus-
sion of innovation is provided that includes the basic concepts, 
characteristics, and dynamics of innovation, as well as a discussion of sys-
tems of innovation and several policy concerns regarding innovation. The 
benefits of a competition structure for innovation will be demonstrated by 
building on well-known economic growth theories, particularly Schum-
peter’s theory of creative destruction and radical innovation, as well as 
Hayek’s theory of discovery. The rationale and justification of an industrial 
policy structure (i.e., market intervention) will also be presented. A short 
analysis of the EU Lisbon Strategy is provided, as well as a short discus-
sion of the effects of a rigid industrial policy that may hinder innovative 
efforts. Finally, a short examination of innovation in the European automo-
tive industry is provided.    
1. Defining Innovation 
There have been significant changes in the role of innovation in economic 
growth.
11 Information technology in particular has already had a substantial 
impact on growth, according to the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), and may offer improved performance 
throughout the economy − even  in sectors that have previously experi-
enced slow growth and a low degree of innovation.
12 While the potential 
for current growth exists, relatively few countries (e.g., the United States in 
the information technology sector) have been able to reap the benefits of 
 
11  Growth theory based on technological change and R&D has largely been focused 
on understanding growth in developed countries. Therefore, the observations and 
information in this paper may not reflect conditions in underdeveloped countries. Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
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developments in innovation. This strongly suggests that the benefits of 
technological change are conditioned on a range of balancing factors and 
policies.
13 Before engaging in a deeper discussion, we must first address 
the basic concept of innovation and draw some general conclusions. 
The concepts of invention and innovation are often confused − under-
standably so, because they are part of the same process. Schumpeter, per-
haps the world’s leading theorist on the subject, was the first to make the 
distinction, and it has generally been incorporated into economic theory 
since.
14 An invention is the first occurrence of an idea for a new process or 
product − a thought, sketch, or model for a new or improved device, prod-
uct, process, or system. As Freeman points out, such inventions may often 
(not always) be patented, but they do not necessarily lead to technical inno-
vations. An innovation, however, is the first attempt to carry it out in prac-
tice.
15 In a sense, an innovation is accomplished when the first commercial 
transaction is made involving the new product, process, system, or device.
16  
Inventions can take place anywhere (i.e., individually or collectively, pri-
vately or publicly), but innovations occur mostly in firms, where an inven-
tion becomes an innovation.
17 Transforming an invention into an 
innovation can depend heavily on several components − namely, knowl-
edge, capability, skills, and resources. Innovation is often seen as the cen-
tral factor that separates competing firms, regions, and countries in terms of 
performance. Thus, firms that are able to carry out innovation are likely to 
prosper at the expense of their less-equipped competitors. In his work, 
 
12  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, A New Economy? The 
Changing Role of Innovation and Information Technology in Growth (Paris: 
OECD, 2000). 
13  Ibid.  
14  C. Freeman, “Formal Scientific and Technical Institutions in the National System of 
Innovation,” in B.A. Lundvall,  National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory 
of Innovation and Interactive Learning (London: Pinter, 1992), 76. 
15  Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, and R. R. Nelson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Innovation (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
16  Freeman, “Formal Scientific and Technical Institutions.” 
17  This is not to say that universities do not play an important role in a knowledge-
based economy, but their most important impact seems to stem from factors such as 
the supply of highly educated and skilled personnel in firms.  Meredith Tunick 
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Schumpeter conceived of innovation as a three-phase technological change 
process: 
•  Invention − the conception of new ideas  
•  Innovation − a process that involves the development of new ideas 
into marketable products and processes  
•  Diffusion − the stage in which the new products and processes are 
spread across the potential market 
Schumpeter’s work heavily emphasizes the role of the entrepreneur who 
innovates (i.e., individual, firm, research facility) and takes what may seem 
an irrational risk by incorporating new (sometimes radical) ideas into prod-
ucts and processes. Perhaps the most noted contribution of Schumpeter’s 
work is his theory of “creative destruction” − an economic process in 
which old ideas and structures (products, processes, and organizations) are 
continually replaced by new industrial activity. Old ideas are destroyed as 
new ones are created and implemented. Schumpeter suggested that creative 
destruction is the source of continuous progress and improved living stan-
dards.  The theory of creative destruction can provide practical and valu-
able insights into the innovation process, which may be of particular 
interest to EU policy makers as they form innovation-based policies.  
1.1   Characteristics and Dynamics of Innovation 
Classical economists long ago realized the value of innovation in terms of 
its effects on long-term growth. Since Schumpeter, innovation has increas-
ingly been viewed as something much more complex − a multidimensional 
process that functions as the primary driver of long-term growth. The study 
of innovation has evolved considerably over the last century, which has 
created an abundance of academic and empirical research devoted solely to 
the examination of innovation and its effects on the economy. The follow-
ing are the most salient features of the scholarly research, which should un-
doubtedly be of interest to policy makers.  
There are several different types of innovation. While technological inno-
vations of the product and process type may reap much attention, organiza-Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
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tional innovations should not be undervalued. Throughout history, some of 
the most important innovations have been of an organizational nature.
18 
Take new distribution systems for example: The system that accompanied 
the development of mass production in the United States a century ago 
revolutionized manufacturing worldwide. Likewise, Toyota and other 
Japanese companies restructured and streamlined the entire value chain in 
the automotive industry in the period following the end of World War II by 
incorporating flexible production techniques like the “just-in-time” sys-
tem.
19  These organizational innovations not only enabled production to be 
refined, but also allowed for plant flexibility to produce a range of products 
on the same production lines without driving up indirect costs.
20 The Japa-
nese lean-production innovation enabled Toyota and others to streamline 
their manufacturing processes and make tremendous profits. Ever since, 
manufacturers all over the globe have attempted to mimic these production 
techniques and methods. This example provides clear signs that organiza-
tional innovation may be an important impetus to growth in its own right.
21  
Beyond the distinction between production and organizational innovation, 
Freeman and Perez distinguish between incremental innovations (i.e., im-
provements in existing production or product technologies) and radical in-
novations (i.e., discontinuous events including the development of a new 
product or process).
22       
Innovation is pervasive. It flourishes not only in high-tech industries but in 
other industries as well, including the service sector.
23 Innovation is occur-
 
18  Jan Fagerberg, What Do We Know About Innovation? Lessons Learned From the 
TEARI Project (TEARI Project Report No. 1, Centre for Technology, Innovation, 
and Culture, University of Oslo, 2004). TEARI Project Report No. 1.   
19  K. Bruland and D. C. Mowery, “Innovation Through Time” in J. Fagerberg, D.C. 
Mowery, and R.R. Nelson, The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).  
20  M. H. Best, The New Competition, Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cam-
bridge, England: Polity Press, 1990), 143. 
21  Fagerberg, What Do We Know About Innovation. 
22  C. Freeman and C. Perez, “Structural Crisis of Adjustment: Business Cycles and 
Investment Behavior” in G. Dosi, et al, Technical Change and Economic Theory 
(London: Pinter, 1988).  
23  F. Malerba, “Sectoral Systems: How and Why Innovation Differs Across Sectors,” 
in Fagerberg, Mowery, and Nelson, The Oxford Handbook of Innovation.  Meredith Tunick 
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ring in “practically all parts of the economy,” not just a subset of high-
technology industries.
24 In the EU, innovation surveys and data demon-
strate that innovation is widely spread across European industrial sectors.
25  
Innovation processes are cumulative in nature. According to Fagerberg, the 
bulk of innovation in modern societies consist of relatively small improve-
ments, and these cumulative improvements are likely to be as great as (or 
greater than) the more “revolutionary” ones.
26 Fagerberg also notes that 
innovation seems to be the product of a lengthy process that is “intertwined 
with diffusion and fundamentally shaped by the learning undertaken 
throughout the process.”
27 Sir Isaac Newton’s saying about “standing on 
the shoulders of giants” applies well here, as future innovations depend on 
the technologies that exist today.  Many of the innovations we see today are 
the result of long processes of gradual improvement and the incorporation 
of a long series of innovations over time. Therefore, it is important for pol-
icy makers to keep in mind that knowledge creation is a long-term invest-
ment; while the benefits are vast, they may not be recognizable 
immediately.      
Radical innovation can occur in response to a specific crisis in existing 
technologies.
28 Take, for example, the replacement of the horse by the 
automobile at the end of the 19th century. When the limits of horse power 
were being reached, the internal combustion engine was able to provide the 
additional “horse power” needed and at the same time reduce the number 
of horses, which were creating urban congestion.
29 This observation fol-
 
24  B.A. Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation 
and Interactive Learning (London: Pinter, 1992), 8. 
25  Luis Navarro, Industrial Policy in the Economic Literature: Recent Theoretical De-
velopments and Implications for EU Policy (Enterprise Directorate-General, Euro-
pean Commission, Enterprise Paper No. 12, 2003). 
26  Fagerberg, What Do We Know About Innovation. 
27  Ibid, 7. 
28  Richard Lipsey and Cliff Bekar, “A Structuralist View of Technical Change and 
Economic Growth,” in T.J. Courchene (ed.), Technology, Information and Public 
Policy (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Eco-
nomic Policy, 1995), 9-83. 
29  Ibid.  Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
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lows Toynbee’s well-known theory that challenges (proportionally) create 
opportunities for responses.
30    
Innovation processes are uncertain and nonlinear. The path of innovation 
is unpredictable and characterized by a complex feedback mechanism and 
interactive relations between numerous actors and institutions within the 
innovation system.
31 Since innovation is a system, rather than a set meth-
odology, there are inherent risks associated with it. In the Schumpeter and 
Hayek tradition, competition is said to serve as an exploration and inven-
tion device that brings about creative destruction − a dynamic that is any-
thing but linear or predictable.    
The application of an innovation is typically characterized by positive 
feedback loops.
32 Success in a technology’s application often leads to a de-
sire to improve on its successes, which can give rise to a new set of prod-
ucts and product techniques. Arthur referred to this phenomenon as the 
“bootstrap effect.” He observed that the depth and breadth of a technol-
ogy’s impact grows in proportion to the resources invested in its use, which 
can lead to acceleration in its rate of diffusion.
33  
Innovation may necessitate structural change.  When new technologies are 
fitted into the structures of their predecessor technologies, they often oper-
ate below their full potential.
34 Thus, major structural changes may be war-
ranted to maximize the capacity of the new technology and to maximize 
efficiency gains.    
Technological cooperation is essential. There is strong evidence that inter-
actions between organizations are crucial in learning processes, which are 
generally the basis for the development of innovations.
35 Edquist suggests 
 
30 Arnold Toynbee, Studies of History: Abridgement of Volumes I-VI (London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1947), 51. 
31  Navarro, Industrial Policy. 
32  Ibid. 
33   B. Arthur, Competing Technologies: An Overview, Technical Change and Eco-
nomic Theory (London: Pinter, 1988). 
34  Lipsey and Bekar, “A Structuralist View of Technical Change.”  
35   Charles Edquist, “Systems of Innovation − Perspectives and Challenges,” in J. 
Fagerberg, D.C. Mowery, and R.R. Nelson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innova-
tion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).   Meredith Tunick 
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that firms “hardly innovate in isolation,” but rather in collaboration and in-
terdependence with other organizations (i.e., suppliers, customers, competi-
tors, universities, schools, government ministries). Innovation by means of 
working within a social network may suggest that further innovation can 
flourish if the boundaries of organizations and industries can be linked to-
gether, especially where problems can be linked together in a creative 
process that challenges and benefits participants.
36 As Navarro highlights, 
recent literature places a stronger emphasis on the pro-competitive aspects 
of knowledge sharing. The concept of “alliance capitalism”
37 used by Dun-
ning relates to the “coexistence of competition, strengthened by globaliza-
tion and liberalization, with an increasing number of alliances and network 
relations between competitors.”
38     
1.2  Systems of Innovation  
Thus far, evidence has been provided to illustrate the characteristics and 
dynamics of innovation. This section briefly addresses systems of innova-
tion (SI), a branch of study that can help clarify the role that institutions 
and governments play in innovation and technological progress. SI at-
tempts to analyze the links between the “all important economic, social, 
political, organizational factors that influence the development, diffusion 
and use of innovations” from an interdisciplinary perspective.
39 
The initial premise is that institutions, laws, and norms can create “incen-
tives and obstacles” for innovation.
40 A trend is apparent in research that 
incorporates these ideas into practice, as many research projects have be-
gun with the assertion that it is necessary to get away from viewing innova-
 
36  Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
37   J. H. Dunning, Alliance Capitalism and Global Business (London: Routledge, 
1997). 
38  Navarro, Industrial Policy.  
39  Charles Edquist, Systems of Innovation: Technology, Institutions, and Organiza-
tions (London: Pinter, 1997), 14. 
40  Edquist, “Systems of Innovation − Perspectives and Challenges.”   Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
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tion as a process of mere individual decision making undertaken independ-
ently of institutional environments.
41  
Since institutions in large part control the external environment in which 
firms operate (vs. a firm’s internal environment), we can assume the insti-
tutional element not only plays an important role in the innovation process, 
it plays a central role. Institutions wield considerable power as they set the 
conditions under which firms can achieve innovative success or failure.
42 
Although a national system of innovation is often used to identify “the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities 
and interactions initiate, import and diffuse new technologies,”
43 several 
authors have emphasized increasing internationalization as an argument 
against the concept of the national system. This is further supported by re-
cent OECD research that confirms the importance of the international di-
mension in systems of innovation.
44   
Interactive learning and user-producer interactions also seem to have a vital 
impact on systems of innovation.
45 Lundvall suggests that the “structure of 
production” and the “institutional set-up” are the two most critical elements 
that “jointly define a system of innovation.”
46 Policy makers therefore not 
only bear a special responsibility to formulate policies focused on the eco-
nomics of knowledge production, but must create strong institutional sys-
tems as well. 
Fagerberg identifies three types of learning within an SI: 
 
41 Keith Smith, “Innovation as a Systematic Phenomenon: Rethinking the Role of Pol-
icy,” Enterprise and Innovation Management Studies, (2000), 73-102. 
42  It should also be noted that internal factors (i.e., corporate structures, strategies, and 
decision making) can also have a great effect on determining the success of an in-
novation. For a more in-depth analysis of firm-level innovation, see Wolfgang 
Streeck, “The Transformation of Corporate Organization in Europe: An Overview,” 
in Institutions, Innovation, and Growth (Cheltenham, England: Elgar, 2003).       
43  C. Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan 
(London: Pinter, 1987). 
44  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dynamising National 
Innovation Systems (Paris: OECD, 2002).  
45  Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation. 
46  Ibid., 10. Meredith Tunick 
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•  Innovation, which takes place mainly in firms and leads to creation 
of “structural capital.” Since structural capital is an asset controlled 
by firms, it is a matter of organizational learning. 
•  Research and Development, which is carried out in universities and 
public research organizations as well as in firms and leads to publicly 
available knowledge owned by firms and other organizations, as well 
as individuals.  
•  Competence building (i.e., training and education), which occurs in 
schools and universities as well as in firms and leads to the creation 
of human capital. Since human capital is controlled by individuals, it 
is a matter of individual learning.
47        
While these types of learning are distinct from one another, they cannot be 
expected to be wholly independent from each other. They most probably 
support and reinforce − or offset − each other.
48 Therefore, it is important to 
focus on the relations between the three kinds of learning. While SI places 
much emphasis on the activities, the individual components cannot be ne-
glected. Fagerberg suggests that policy makers should focus on both activi-
ties and components to understand and explain innovation processes. The 
relations between activities and components, as well as the different kinds 
of components, ought to be addressed.
49 
1.3  Innovation and Policy Considerations   
There is no doubt that innovation has great economic effects, and its bene-
fits are universally appreciated. However, much uncertainty exists over 
which policies provide the most supportive environment for innovation and 
technological progress.   
It has been noted that Schumpeterian economics can serve as a valuable 
resource in outlining the focus and nature of technology and innovation 
policy goals. As Schumpeter asserted, the creative destruction process is 
 
47  Edquist, “Systems of Innovation − Perspectives and Challenges,” 192.  
48  Ibid.  
49  Ibid.  Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
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occurring at the firm and industry sector level. But we also know from SI 
studies that the process is heavily influenced by institutions, laws, and 
norms that are created by the state. Therefore, we can infer that there is a 
complex interaction between the state policies and market processes that 
influence the decisions taken by firms. It is within this realm that policy 
makers should concentrate their efforts. While much research is being done 
in this area, this paper seeks only to underscore three of the most prominent 
themes.     
Subsidies can reduce incentives to innovate. As European firms tend to ex-
perience relatively large rents, inefficient firms generally do not leave the 
market; as a result, too few new, efficient enterprises are created to replace 
them. As Alesina points out, the result is “insufficient innovation and no 
‘creative destruction’ by which the natural disappearance of less efficient 
firms leaves room for more efficient ones.”
 50 Instead of encouraging crea-
tive destruction, European governments tend to heavily subsidize incum-
bent firms, thinking that these grants will somehow advance innovation. An 
example of this line of thinking was German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
decision to provide 25 million euros in subsidies to existing firms and in-
frastructure investment, one of her first economic decisions in office.
51   
The regulatory environment is crucial. While sufficient focus should be 
given to policy making in the area of stimulating innovation, proper atten-
tion should also be paid to the factors that can significantly help or hinder 
innovation in real time. The development or success of an industry (par-
ticularly an emerging industry) is faced with a number of problems or un-
certainties that government policies can help to address. For instance, 
failure to create product and technical standards can impede cost improve-
ments. A lack of standard is often caused by product and technology uncer-
tainties that exist, especially in emerging industries.
52 Likewise, industries 
often face delays in gaining recognition and approval by regulatory agen-
 
50  Alberto Alesina and Francesco Givazzi, The Future of Europe: Reform and Decline 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 79-100. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Xiudian Dai, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and New Technologies: Philips and 
the European Consumer Electronics Industry, (Oxford: Pergamon, 1996), 24-27.  Meredith Tunick 
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cies when offering new approaches to needs currently being addressed by 
other means and subject to regulation.
53  
Dynamic R&D programs are essential. It has been widely established that 
R&D plays a significant factor in economic growth.  But innovation policy 
discourse tends to focus heavily on how much R&D funding is available 
and how it should be distributed, rather than on innovation itself. Further-
more, the level of R&D funding explains very little of the economic and 
competitiveness performance of the economy.
54 Attention should also be 
placed on the productivity of R&D spending. Since innovation comes from 
the application of knowledge accumulation, failing to focus on the “innova-
tive output” would be counterproductive. R&D efforts would therefore 
greatly benefit from more dynamic R&D policies aimed at not only stimu-
lating innovation, but applying it.  
2. Governance of Innovation: Competition Policy and 
Industrial Policy  
The EU uses two key methods for governance of innovation − competition 
policy and industrial policy. Although the EU’s internal market was origi-
nally designed to function as a market economy, over time, elements of in-
dustrial policy (i.e., government interventions due to perceived market 
failures) have gradually worked their way into the governing treaties of the 
EU.
55 Competition policy aims to strengthen market forces, to prevent mar-
ket power and other distortions to competition. Industrial policy, however, 
attempts to remedy imperfections through government intervention. At the 
most basic level, competition policy and industrial policy are fundamen-
tally opposed to each other. 
 
53  Ibid. 
54  Navarro, “Industrial Policy in the Economic Literature.”  
55  Legal basis for industrial policy, see: Merger Control Regulation 1989 − promotion 
of technical progress as an exception; Maastricht Treaty Article 157 ff − fostering 
better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research, and 
technological development; Single European Act (SEA) 1987 − regional cohesion 
policy and research and development; Amsterdam Treaty 1997 − social policy and 
employment policy.  Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
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Creating coherence between the objectives of competition, industrial, and 
innovation policies is essential for the future and success of the European 
integration. Without coherence, the evolution of Europe’s economic struc-
ture may lead to a further weakening of competitiveness.
56 The following is 
a brief examination of some key elements of competition and industrial 
policies.     
3. Competition Policy  
Competition is the core of the market and the permanent driving force in an 
efficient economy, since competitive forces are what reward successful ac-
tivities and penalize inefficiency and failure. Although perfect competition 
does not exist, competition policy attempts to protect competition (not 
competitors) and guarantees economic freedom.  Without a competition 
policy, the market would be destroyed, as cartels and monopolies would 
rule.  
It can be said that a competitive market is like a democratic society, in the 
sense that no individual or company is allowed to exercise power over an-
other individual or company.
57 It is therefore critical to protect the funda-
mental principles of freedom in the marketplace against attempts (by 
individuals, companies, and/or groups) to extend influence and power over 
others, either through manipulation of rules or through illegal behavior.  
Numerous economists have observed that technological change and pro-
ductivity growth tend to occur more freely when the government sets a fa-
vorable climate for change.
58 In some cases, we can observe firms banning 
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together in cooperation on various joint R&D projects.
59 We know from 
Dunning’s work that “alliance capitalism” has become increasingly preva-
lent. Therefore, policy makers must reinforce competition policies that cre-
ate an environment where these competitive partnerships are possible.   
3.1 Competition Policy and Innovation  
Competition presents an interactive process in which actors are rivals, and 
these rivals create or affect the incentives for innovation. Competition ap-
pears to have a substantial impact on how a firm formulates its business 
strategy, especially with regard to R&D. In 1934, Schumpeter observed 
that entrepreneurs create technical and financial innovations in the face of 
competition and falling profits, and these new activities in turn generate 
economic growth.
60  Empirical data suggests that competition is the main 
driver behind a firm’s decision to spend funds on innovation and knowl-
edge creation. Porter suggested that competition is beneficial for growth 
because it forces firms to innovate in order to survive,
61 and according to a 
2000 OECD report on innovation and information technology growth, 
“competition matters” in knowledge-based economies, because it drives 
firms to invest in efficiency-enhancing technologies and innovation.
62 The 
OECD asserts that firms will invest in innovation if they can expect suffi-
cient returns and if competition forces them to improve performance.
63  
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Recent empirical work
64 suggests a positive correlation between product 
market competition and productivity growth or “innovativeness” within a 
firm or industry sector. Competition can also have a positive overall effect 
on the rate of innovation, because firms may try to innovate in order to es-
cape competition.
65    
3.2   Overview of Economic Growth Theories and Technology 
Policy 
Behind technology lies technological knowledge.
66 We know that we can 
make new systems, machines, or products that we do not have blueprints 
for, but we know based on technological knowledge whether we can try to 
build them or not.
67 Until we attempt to build a new type of automobile, for 
example, we cannot be certain of its development costs or its running costs. 
The more our proposed automobile is like the automobiles we’ve built pre-
viously, the more certain we can be regarding its costs. Likewise, the more 
our proposed automobile is unlike any automobile we’ve built in the past, 
the greater the cost uncertainty.
68  
In terms of discovery of new technologies, people are much more produc-
tive today than 100 years ago. According to Baumol, “virtually all the eco-
nomic growth that has occurred since the eighteenth century is ultimately 
attributable to innovation.”
69 Technological change makes an enormous 
contribution to a society’s increased productivity and arises from formal 
research and development programs and from informal (individual) trial 
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and error. In essence, technological change involves discovering new ways 
of getting more out of our resources.
70    
Since the time of Adam Smith, economists have attempted to explain why 
some societies succeed and others fail in producing the goods that make 
societies healthy and prosperous. Smith argued that when societies adopt 
rules of market capitalism, their economies grow; when they fail to adopt 
rules of market capitalism, their economies fail. Several economic models 
have been developed to explain the factors surrounding growth. The two 
most recognized mainstream theories are neo-classical theory and the new 
growth theory.   
3.2.1  Neo-Classical Theory  
Neo-classical theory (i.e., the Solow-Swan model) was the first economic 
model to incorporate technological progress as a factor to explain economic 
growth. It assumes that the key determinant of growth is the capital accu-
mulation as productivity growth results from increases in the amount of 
capital per worker. In the long run, the model suggests that growth is de-
termined exclusively by the rate of technological change.  
Critics (including Schumpeter) have identified the shortcomings of the neo-
classical model in great detail. Their concerns lie with the theory’s basic 
assumptions that people have full and perfect information, act perfectly ra-
tionally, and are permanently seeking to maximize their satisfaction as con-
sumers and maximize their profits.
71 Economists over time have pointed 
out that these notions fail to incorporate important aspects of human behav-
ior, as people’s choices are not always determined by logical consequences. 
In addition, the premise that perfect knowledge and perfect competition 
exist is highly questionable; they are widely accepted as impossible apart 
from divine intervention.  
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3.2.2 New  Growth  Theory 
Romer’s new growth theory renewed the study of economic growth by fo-
cusing on knowledge investments and “spillovers” and by conceptualizing 
innovation as a product of a deliberate effort of firms, rather than a pure 
externality.
72 It seeks to address the shortcomings of the Solow-Swan 
model by incorporating two concepts: 1) Technological progress is a prod-
uct of economic activity; and 2) knowledge and technology are character-
ized by increasing returns, and these returns drive the process of growth.
73  
Romer clarified the role of knowledge in the technological process when he 
wrote:  
Ultimately, all increases in standards of living can be traced to discoveries of 
more valuable arrangements for the things in the earth’s crust and atmos-
phere.… No amount of savings and investment, no policy of macroeconomic 
fine tuning, no set of tax and spending incentives can generate sustained eco-
nomic growth unless it is accompanied by the countless large and small dis-
coveries that are required to create more value from a fixed set of natural 
resources.
74 
Ideas are non-rival goods − once developed, an idea to build a safer vehicle 
can be used by a vehicle manufacturer, supplier, etc. Historical experience 
suggests that as time passes, “one technological change may bring massive 
gains, to be followed by another that brings smaller gains, to be followed 
by a shift that brings even larger gains.”
75 This can certainly be witnessed 
in every industry sector, especially where technology is used. The devel-
opment of sensor technology, for example, can be characterized as a single 
technological advancement that has brought massive gains, as sensors have 
been integrated into countless applications and tasks. From heat sensing, to 
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motion detection, to ranging sensors − sensor technology has brought im-
measurable gains to products and processes in just about every modern in-
dustry. In the automotive industry for instance, sensors contribute to the 
functioning of numerous systems, including vehicle safety and fuel effi-
ciency,
76 and even to the manufacturing process itself through the use of 
robotics and high-tech equipment at the plant level. The message here is 
that there are no known limits to economic growth based on technological 
change.   
New growth theory holds that “the ability to grow the economy by increas-
ing knowledge, rather than labor or capital, creates opportunities for nearly 
boundless growth.”
77 Because ideas are infinitely shareable and reuseable, 
we can accumulate them without limit. In effect, new growth theory de-
scribes the economy as a kind of perpetual motion system in which the 
economy is constantly being disturbed by technological innovations (where 
some people lose, and others gain). Some have observed that new growth 
theory expresses the economy in a kind of competitive Darwinian manner, 
where survivors succeed in “creating, adopting, and improving new tech-
nologies.”
78 Policy makers, as a result, can raise growth permanently by 
increasing the size of investments on R&D or improving the “appropriabil-
ity conditions” of knowledge.
79    
3.3 Schumpeter  − Creative Destruction  
This paper has relied heavily on Schumpeter’s insights into the innovation 
process. From Schumpeter’s work, we can draw several conclusions that 
are key to policy debates:    
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•  Increased competition in the market strengthens firms’ incentives to 
innovate  
•  Competition policy should therefore be strengthened and strictly en-
forced.  
•  Patent protection should be a key issue − the more patent rights are 
extended, the more inventors may be discouraged to inhibit the flow 
of ideas.
80  
•  Universities should continue to develop relationships with firms to 
ensure that innovative ideas turn into adopted technologies.
81 
•  As technological change thrives on competition, a liberal interna-
tional trade strategy may be beneficial.  
•  Education systems may need to be strengthened and mobility barriers 
and labor restrictions may need to be reduced. 
•  Policy makers should remain aware of the long-run implications of 
policies, because even a small increase in long-run growth rates im-
plies enormous economic gains.
82 
3.4 Hayek  − Competition as a Discovery Procedure  
In addition to Schumpeter’s innovation concepts, Hayek’s theory of com-
petition as a discovery procedure provides evidence from which we can 
draw several helpful conclusions. Hayek begins with the assumption that 
like experimentation in science, “competition is foremost a discovery pro-
cedure.”
83 Competition may not lead to a maximization of measureable re-
sults, but as Hayek asserts, under favorable conditions, competition leads to 
the use of more skill and knowledge than any other known procedure. Ac-
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cording to Hayek, competition is of value because it constitutes a discovery 
procedure which would not be needed if we could predict the future.
84   
While Schumpeter’s approach describes the entrepreneur as a creative de-
stroyer, Hayek’s approach observes the individual as a creator, adopter and 
user of knowledge.
85 Although their works differ in several ways, both 
Schumpeter and Hayek assert that competition is an absolutely necessary 
precondition for innovation. Although their works do not perfectly conform 
to one another, a unified Schumpeter-Hayek system provides a comple-
mentary platform for generic economic analysis.
86     
4. Industrial Policy  
There is often some confusion over the aim and focus of industrial policy. 
From a broad perspective, industrial policy can be defined as government 
intervention due to perceived market failures. To this end, governments 
willingly restrict competition and offer privileged financing or treatment to 
certain sectors. This approach aims to promote rising industries and global 
players, foster competitiveness, and provide framework programs for R&D 
projects. There are two main types of industrial policy − a selective indus-
trial policy favors specific firms, industries, or sectors (i.e., choosing na-
tional champions), while a general industrial policy does not discriminate 
between firms, industries, or sectors.  
The industrial policy approach tends to be associated with certain skepti-
cism of the government’s ability to fully rectify the market problem, as pol-
icy makers pretence of knowledge in an open and competitive 
environment.
87 In the innovation process, some innovations will succeed 
and others will fail, but regardless of any circumstances, governments have 
no way of determining the future. In some cases government intervention 
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leads to “government failure,” which can be characterized as a kind of 
“over-adjustment,” and as a result more than offsets the benefits of inter-
vention.
88 This approach is also criticized for wasting public resources, fos-
tering rents, and inciting corruption.  
The most common forms of market failures are indivisibilities, external-
ities, and information problems (i.e., asymmetries). Indivisibilities exist 
when there are high sunk costs acting as market entry or exit barriers. Indi-
visibilities are also characterized by economies of scale and economies of 
scope.  
A common justification for the use of industrial policy is the occurrence of 
an “externality” in knowledge creation.
89 Innovations are said to have high 
costs because the one who invests the most (e.g., R&D, labor) benefits the 
least—once an innovation is created and diffused it becomes very easy to 
copy. This concept is referred to as a “positive externality.” Firms are un-
able to realize all the benefits of their own investment because some of 
these benefits flow to other firms and sectors.  This provides evidence that 
there may be a role for policy makers to organize publically funded R&D 
projects, in order to provide incentives for firms to invest in knowledge 
creation, despite the externalities.  
Information asymmetries may also exist (e.g., principal-agent problem). 
For instance, when one party has better or more information than the other 
− about the quality of a used car, for example − this can create an imbal-
ance of power in transactions between the buyer and seller, and as a result 
one side is at a disadvantage relative to the other. Information asymmetries 
may also present themselves as adverse selection problems, opportunism, 
or moral hazards. These information imperfections may help to explain 
why many firms prefer to carry out in-house R&D projects or mutually 
share resources with competing firms, rather than contract the work out to a 
third party.
90 Policy makers may therefore be interested in addressing in-
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formation asymmetry problems in order to establish policies that seek to 
create an environment where both sides can achieve mutual maximum 
benefit. 
Interestingly, there is a strong tension in treaty documents between compe-
tition policy and industrial policy.
91 From its inception, the EU had a pure 
economic focus and was designed to function as a market economy with 
competition serving as the cornerstone. Over time however, the EU has be-
come a political actor (as well as a legal actor); political preferences have 
often led to market intervention as politicians seek to shape economic de-
velopment.
92 
The current Reform Treaty provides several rationales for market interven-
tion − many of which are problematic from an economic perspective. The 
Reform Treaty aims to achieve a “highly competitive social market econ-
omy,”
93 yet it establishes a principle of a collective welfare state. This goal 
is incompatible with the original concept of the market economy, where 
competition is the cornerstone.
94 The Reform Treaty also devalues the no-
tion of competition, by removing it as a general objective of the EU and 
only referencing in a protocol.
95 Furthermore, the Treaty strengthens the 
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role of industrial policy (e.g., rationale for market intervention),
96 which 
can lead to increased inefficiency and government failure.   
4.1  Market Intervention  
Imperfect competition is often the rationale for targeted industrial policy. 
Brander and Spencer (1983) developed the case for “strategic policy,” a 
trade policy that affects the outcome of strategic interactions between firms 
in a market that is dominated by a small number of sellers (i.e., oligopo-
lists). They assume that policy makers may foster artificially dominant po-
sitions for domestic firms to retain profits within their national borders. 
Brander and Spencer’s analysis shows that subsidies can deter sector in-
vestment and production by foreign competitors as a benefit to the domes-
tic economy.  
Another common rationale for government intervention is the “infant in-
dustry” argument, which argues for protection of newer industries against 
older ones. The infant industry argument has been subject to a number of 
well-founded criticisms.
97 While there may be cases in which infant indus-
try protection is legitimate, there are practical problems in creating policies 
mainly because policy makers lack sufficient industry and trade informa-
tion. In addition, proponents of infant industry protection argue that policy 
makers should impose tariffs, quotas, and duty taxes to keep international 
competitors from damaging the infant industry − strategies that challenge 
the notions of competition and free trade.      
4.2  Industrial Policy Developments in Europe 
Since the 1990s, Community institutions have clearly included innovation 
polices in their documents
98 and several innovation initiatives helped to set 
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the stage for current EU innovation policy.
99 Since the formation of the 
Lisbon Strategy (2000) that sets a goal for the EU to become “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy,” innovation has 
gained increasing importance in the EU policy framework.
100 In addition, 
the Lisbon Strategy has provided a new impetus and rationale for industrial 
policy making in the EU. According to the Commission, the main role of 
industrial policy is to “provide the right framework conditions for enter-
prise development and innovation.”
 101 The Commission also maintains that 
the role of public authorities is to “act only where needed”
 and reaffirms its 
commitment “to avoid return to selective interventionist policies.”
102 In 
theory, the Commission asserts that interventionist policies should be 
avoided, but in practice it seems to operate quite differently. In 2005, the 
Commission announced a new approach to strengthen Europe’s industrial 
base. The initiative provided several cross-sectoral policy initiatives (e.g., 
intellectual property rights, competitiveness, market access, sectoral skills, 
and industrial research) for 27 industry sectors, handpicked by the Com-
mission. In order to build on EU’s industry’s existing strengths, the Com-
mission explained that it had “undertaken a detailed screening of the 
competitiveness of 27 individual sectors… The policy areas chosen… were 
those particularly important for sectoral productivity growth and interna-
tional competitiveness.”
103  
This new industrial policy strategy is a risky one for Europe and raises sev-
eral questions and concerns. First, if the main goal for industrial policy is to 
 
99  These included the Green Paper on Innovation (1995), followed by the First Action 
Plan for Innovation in Europe (1996), which identified policy directions and set 
goals for the Union to “foster an innovation culture,” establish a framework condu-
cive to innovation,” and “better articulate research and innovation” in Union docu-
ments.  
100   Federica Rossi, “Innovation Policy in the European Union: Instruments and Ob-
jectives.”  
101   European Commission, “Implementing the Community Lisbon Program: A Policy 
Framework to Strengthen EU Manufacturing − Towards a More Integrated Ap-
proach for Industrial Policy,” COM(2005)474 (Brussels: October 5, 2005).  
102   Ibid.  
103  European Commission, “A New Industrial Policy: Creating the Conditions for 
Manufacturing to Thrive” (press release, October 10, 2005). Promoting Innovation in the European Union 
 29
provide a good framework for development and competition for all sectors, 
why was only a subset of industry selected? Second, the Commission did 
not make its selection procedure known. How did it choose these 27 spe-
cific industries?  Third, if these new policies were to fail, who would have 
the capability to correct them? With these questions unanswered, a critical 
observer is likely to presume that the EU’s new industrial policy distorts 
competition, fosters rent-seeking behavior, and lacks a long-term focus  
5. Damaging Effects of a Rigid Industrial Policy 
Since innovation processes are uncertain and non-linear, they need the 
proper room to function effectively. As institutions, laws and norms can 
create incentives and obstacles for innovation, it is essential that govern-
ment policies be somewhat flexible and adaptable in nature so that innova-
tion can persist. 
In 2001, European policy makers seemed confident that Europe would be-
come the leading engine of growth for the global economy. Macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, low inflation levels, and an increasingly robust public 
finance situation all boded well for future prospects.
104 However, many of 
these expectations have proved to be much too optimistic, as Europe has 
been unable to find the right formula for growth. This lack of growth may 
also be at the core of Europe’s competitiveness problem.
105 There is wide-
spread belief that these issues stem from the rigidities of the European 
market, but policy makers in Europe have devoted a great deal of attention 
to reforming labor markets and pension systems − reforms that may well be 
necessary. However, reforms that increase competition may be more effec-
tive in achieving Europe’s economic goals.  
Critics often tout the somewhat negative consequences of competition. 
Their concerns are that increased competition would result in job losses and 
thus cause problems in the area of social cohesion. Some theoretical litera-
ture maintains that increased competition may have perverse effects on ef-
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ficiency, particularly in areas related to innovation.
106 These concerns may 
certainly be valid, but the overall consensus of academics and policy mak-
ers alike is that the benefits of competition outweigh any costs.
107 This po-
sition can be supported by two main arguments. First, as indicated by 
recent OECD research, well-designed product market reforms can play a 
key role in boosting productivity.
108 Second, many labor market rigidities 
are intrinsically linked to market distortions.
109 Inefficient regulations typi-
cally generate economic rents that in turn foster additional labor market 
rigidities.
110 Therefore, when pursuing market reforms, policy makers may 
find it necessary to facilitate structural changes in labor markets as well.  
Since a greater proportion of innovations today are radical rather than ele-
mental, the conditions surrounding successful innovation are as important 
as ever.
111 There is a fundamental difference between the ability of U.S. 
companies and European companies to change their organizations fast 
enough to adapt to new technologies. The slower a firm adapts, the longer 
it takes for the new technology to raise productivity.
112 
In the 1980s, while U.S. corporations were restructuring, European firms 
were protected by the state, which provided large subsidies, effectively 
shielding them from outside competition. In addition, European firms typi-
cally were elaborately structured “to allow for lengthy consensus building 
in decision-making.”
113 In Germany, for instance, union representatives 
made up nearly half of supervisory boards in large German firms − a struc-
ture that is perhaps not favorable to organizational change. Volkswagen’s 
shareholders had to bribe union leaders on the supervisory board and pro-
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vide them with luxury trips to get their agreement on changes to working 
rules.
114 In light of these factors, the EU may need to de-politicize indus-
trial policy and restore market competition principles in order to achieve its 
stated innovation and productivity goals.           
5.1  Possible Prevention of Innovation  
As Schumpeter’s and Hayek’s work has illustrated, competition is an “ex-
ploration and invention device” that brings about creative destruction. This 
dynamic is not linear or predictable. If we had perfect information and were 
certain about the future, competition would not be needed.
115 Since indus-
trial policy eliminates some level of flexibility and competition and politi-
cizes economic activity, it is reasonable to infer that it also hinders the 
prevention of innovation. As knowledge creation and innovation are widely 
regarded as the ultimate sources of economic growth, these issues should 
be of critical importance to policy makers.   
5.2 Externalities 
When we think of public policy we tend to think in normative terms, that 
is, about the public interest and public choice. Economists often identify 
four areas in which market intervention may be needed to achieve eco-
nomic efficiency: externalities, monopoly, public goods and incomplete 
social insurance, and the distribution of income and wealth.
116 These ra-
tionales for market intervention are particularly common in the EU, since 
many Member States have long histories of state-owned industries, gov-
ernment subsidies, and social welfare programs. As SI studies demonstrate, 
innovation is a process not of individual decision making, but one where 
the structure of production and the institutional set-up are the most critical 
elements.
117 Therefore, policymakers must weigh the pros and cons of their 
political decisions against the pros and cons of economic efficiency before 
intervening into the market.   
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6. Case Study: Innovation in the European Automotive 
Industry 
The EU automotive sector is the largest automotive production region in 
the world, employing about 2 million employees directly and nearly 8 mil-
lion indirectly.
118 Several million units are produced in Europe annually 
(16.9 million units in 2002), and in 2002 auto exports accounted for € 66.2 
billion. Given these figures, there is no doubt that the success of the Euro-
pean economy rests heavily on the success of Europe’s automotive sector.  
As the automobile becomes more high-tech, the manufacturing, design, and 
production becomes more complex for auto manufacturers and suppliers. 
This reality is balanced with the shared goals of making products quicker, 
better, cheaper, safer, and cleaner. The automobile has seen drastic changes 
over its lifetime − it has been transformed from a relatively simple me-
chanical machine into a highly sophisticated, complex mechanism that de-
pends heavily on electrical and sensor-based platforms and equipment.  
Recent environmental and safety considerations are putting increased pres-
sure on automotive manufacturers to produce vehicles that are radically 
different from previous designs. Several examples of these technological 
achievements can already be seen on vehicles today; in the area of safety 
technology  − electronic stability control,
119 adaptive speed control, and 
brake assistance technologies; and in the area of environmental technology 
− electricity and battery technologies (e.g., hybrid electric vehicles, fuel 
cell electric vehicles) and alternative fuel sources. Many observers, includ-
ing the European Commission, forecast further rapid changes in technology 
for the automotive industry during the next 10 years.  
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The EU has devoted considerable attention to automotive R&D programs 
that are ultimately intended to bolster innovation, technological progress, 
growth, and competitiveness. These programs include the Intelligent Car 
Initiative, aimed at strengthening European research and policy in the area 
of information and communication technologies, and the Competitive 
Automotive Regulatory System for the 21st Century (CARS 21), a public-
private high-level working group whose objective is to supply recommen-
dations to the Commission to improve the competitiveness of the European 
automotive industry.
120 But do these programs and others like them repre-
sent all that is needed for the automotive industry to increase its innovation 
efforts and overall competiveness?  
Just two years ago, Günter Verheugen, Vice President of the European 
Commission responsible for Enterprise and Industry, raised several issues 
related to the state of Europe’s automotive industry.
121 In his remarks, Ver-
heugen said, “We must reinforce our industry’s capacity for competition 
and innovation and this means that we must at last get rid of the obstacles 
in the path of small and medium-sized enterprises.” He also argued for im-
provements in road safety, trade policy and intellectual property protection 
which would be taken up by the CARS 21 Group.
122 Although progress has 
certainly been made, if rapid changes in automotive technology are ex-
pected over the next 10 years, policy makers may have more work to do. In 
promoting innovation, policy makers should be careful to create policies 
and standards that are forward looking and are technology neutral (as op-
posed to picking technology winners). However, a technology neutral stan-
dard may also in effect require a specific technology − thus, the technical 
aspects of any policy should be handled thoroughly and with care.
123       
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7. Conclusion − Creating Innovation Incentives    
Challenges of globalization have forced European firms to evolve by mod-
ernizing their manufacturing approaches, working collaboratively in net-
works, strengthening links between research and innovation, and increasing 
the value of their products, production, and services.
124 But it is clear that 
there is much more riding on a firm’s success in the knowledge-based 
economy, beyond its own internal business decisions. The environment in 
which firms innovate and operate in is crucial to the competitiveness of 
both the firm, and the economy in which it operates.  
Technological change and productivity growth tend to occur more freely 
when the government sets a favorable climate.
125 In a competitive market, 
the climate for innovation is quite favorable as competition forces firms to 
innovate in order to survive,
126 and it drives firms to invest in efficiency-
enhancing technologies.
127 In a market driven by industrial policy, innova-
tion may be obstructed due to market rigidities,
128 inefficient regulations 
and the politicization of the economy.  EU policy makers therefore face a 
challenging task − to create a climate for innovation to prosper in all sec-
tors, while keeping in mind that the role of government is to act as a trustee 
ensuring that public interest is considered in the development process. 
129  
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8. Summary - Competition and Industrial Policy: EU In-
novation 
As this paper has explained, the role of knowledge and innovation has 
changed during the last quarter century. This realization may now lead to a 
bit of fresh thinking in policy making to increase economic knowledge-
based objectives, without compromising other policies. Evidence has been 
presented to affirm that the process of innovation is dynamic and relies on a 
competitive environment to function. In addition, institutions, laws and 
norms can create incentives and obstacles for innovation. Therefore, it is 
important for policy makers to address the fundamental conflicts between 
competition and industrial policy.    
This paper has attempted to highlight some of the many challenges facing 
Europe in terms of technical change and innovation, and economic com-
petitiveness. Although significant institutional policy may need to change, 
there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Making adjustments to Europe’s 
economy will not be easy, no matter how slight they seem; but if Europe is 
to restore its knowledge-based economic competitiveness, new approaches 
to policy will be needed.  
Once the economic roots of innovation creation are understood by policy 
makers, they can help to transform the economy into a highly competitive, 
knowledge-based, dynamic one. So long as policymakers encourage a pol-
icy infrastructure that supports innovation, creative destruction can con-
tinue. And as new growth theory exemplifies, “the ability to grow the 
economy by increasing knowledge, creates opportunities for nearly bound-
less growth.”
130 
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